JEU DES FORTIFICATIONS ou DE LA GUERRE.

POLITICAL RESEARCH: ORGANIZATION AND DESIGN

PROD

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IN THE NEWS: Recent Ford F. grants: $2,706M to provide video tape recorders to non-commercial stations affiliated with *Nat. Educational Television & Radio Center;* $423M to Williams College for grad. training program for foreign students in economic problems of less-developed countries; $400M to SSRC for research, training, conferences on American govt. processes; $375M to *Resources for the Future* for inter-university research on urban economic problems; $120M to American Pol. Sci. F. for regional seminars. * * * Rockefeller F. grants include $500M in outright grants to institutions where its Fellows are studying; $285M to Harvard Grad. School of Pub. Admin. for 4-yr. study of finance & administration problems of research in U.S. in application & determination of public policy; $190.5M to U. of N.C. *Inst. for Research in Social Sciences.* * * * Buhl F. gave $250M to Allegheny College to endow professorship in pol. sci. * * * Princeton U. established chair of journalism & public relations with $500M from bequests amidst much hoopla.

SSRC: Numerous fellowships & grants-in-aid for research are offered in 1959-60. They include Faculty Research Fellowships (max. value $6M for 1 yr., $12M for 2 yrs.) applications due 2/1/60 for awards announced in April '60. Grants for research on U.S. govt. & legal process, up to $25M, must be applied for by 12/7/59. Up to $6M will be granted to individuals for research on national security policy, applications due 11/16/59. With *Amer. Council of Learned Societies,* four foreign area research grant programs are sponsored: of these, Latin American Studies, & Slavic & E. European Studies application dates are not yet past.

APSA CONVENTION: The recent APSA Convention in Washington was said by a conservative political philosopher to be dominated by political behaviorists (a term *PROD* eschews). There is a syndrome of the modal influential of APSA but we can't detail it yet. * * * We did wonder how far from the academic axis the proceedings have swung in recent years, & find the results of our count, as with most counting, shocking or relieving depending on the point of view. Of 52 chairmen & 67 speakers we counted, nearly one-fifth of chairmen & one-third of those giving papers were *not* holding typical professorial posts: 5 chairmen & 11 speakers were from research centers; 4 chairmen & 2 speakers were from foundations; 7 speakers were public officials; & one chairman & speaker were businessmen.

Applying Wargaming to the Cold War

We must realize, as the U.S.S.R. has long since realized, that the cold war involves the use of all social forces as weapons and weapon systems. The techniques of wargaming as conducted by military officers and "political gaming," carried out by social scientists, should be combined for the gaming of cold war instruments and programs. Such gaming, as outlined here, would contribute to the theory, testing and planning of cold war weapon systems.

The question raised by this paper is primarily a practical one. It is whether the present dynamic international situation does not call for a thoroughgoing and scholarly application of the gaming method to the cold war.

I. CONCEPTIONS, TAXONOMY AND DEFINITION

To minimize semantic confusion, the following background may be helpful. It is assumed, as in current linguistics, that unless taxonomy, definition and the conceptualization of any phenomena considered can be technically established, they should follow usage.

In the case of the phenomena under discussion here, there has as yet been neither technical determination nor commonality of usage. The general conceptions involved have not been crystallized. There is no established definition. And, as for taxonomy, the term "gaming" is applied in common yet in different contexts by two groups of persons. One group has begun to speak of "political gaming" the cold war; the other speaks of "wargaming" the cold war. While it does not seem worth while at present to apply content analysis to determine more precisely the prevalence of the different terms, conceptions and definitions (if any) used by these two groups and/or others, the two more common contexts will be mentioned briefly.

The use of the term "wargaming the cold war" seems to derive from the following: first, the application of the term "wargaming" to war exercises and/or war maneuvers by the military; second, the consideration of political (and associated) factors and settings in relation to such exercises; third, the partial substitution of indoor, fictional war exercises for outdoors, overt war exercises; fourth, the elaboration of the role of political, economic, social and other non-military factors in such indoor, simulated exercises.

Personal participation in the fourth aspect of this development (quite without cognizance of the conception and development of "political gaming," discussed below), suggested this question. Why not consider and conduct such games with this variation: that, in view of the futility of mutual annihilation with current weaponry, the military's equipment and personnel be employed primarily for purposes other than direct physical destruction of the enemy or his power? In other words, a long-term, more or less continual game or series of games would be developed, in which the dominant concern would be to influence the potential enemy toward this country's objectives using all possible means but with minimum destructive effects.[1]

While wargaming has been conducted by military officers, "political gaming" has been conducted chiefly by political scientists and social research organiza-

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[1] Development Planning Note, No. 58-DAP-2, "A Program for Coherent Research and Development of Military Science." Hq. U.S. Air Force. Feb. 17, 1958, pp. 1, 6-8, passim.

tions, with the assistance of a few foundations. Many papers on political gaming have appeared;[2] all of them assume that the exercises are only in their developmental stage. Particular emphasis is put on varying them in different ways and on assessing their utility for such purposes as testing political strategies, forecasting, producing inventiveness and political insight, scientific breakthrough and training. The role of military action is usually held in reserve in these exercises, being regarded as indicating a breakdown of the peaceful conduct of politics.

The conceptions, emphases and terms of political gaming on the one hand and of wargaming on the other may further affect the conceptions and definitions of gaming the cold war. For instance, deliberations of the Military Science Study Group variety would probably expand the roles assigned the military establishment in gaming cold warfare and "peacefare." Again, a "national policy academy" or "freedom academy" such as those proposed in certain bills before Congress might tend to expand the non-military factors in the cold war.

Whatever directions the substantive content of such developments take, certain gaming process features will be common to both political gaming and indoor wargaming. These common instrumentalities are: (1) At least two opposed parties, with others on the sidelines as potentially active allies or as neutrals. (2) Each of the opposed parties, and possibly each of the more active allies, operating as a team. (3) Umpires, with whom initial objectives and resources are cleared, if not previously determined by them. (4) Each team making its moves by first having them approved by the umpires as proposals for action, and then merely announcing or posting them as *moves being made*, all moves being charted on a map. (5) Finally, rating individual

teams and the success of the game as a whole by the extent to which teams carry out the initially set objectives. These procedures are the minimum that must be assumed in any conception and definition of gaming the cold war.

II. PROPOSAL, SETTING AND PRACTICE

From the viewpoint of politically sophisticated military officers, why should the wargaming complex be confined to outdoor and "laboratory" wargaming of military forces? Why should it be limited to devising multiple, alternative strategies for hot-war conditions? Why should field-testing of individual pieces of equipment and armament be imperative only for the "hardware" weapons and weapon systems?

It is taken for granted that only with the help of the total wargaming complex—testing of weapons, devising of strategies, and laboratory and outdoor wargaming—are our trained military officers able to keep our military machine capable of competing with possible opposing military forces. How is it, then, that we still assume that we can succeed in the almost infinitely difficult, complicated, cold war without a corresponding wargaming complex—including a similar testing of cold-war instruments, a devising of multiple, alternative, long-range plans and short-range programs for the cold war, and the actual gaming of those plans and programs with top specialists on both cold-war-gaming teams?

The present threshing out of possible individual moves for one given cold war situation after another, as is done in an over-all policy-coordinating committee and the National Security Council, is extremely valuable. So are the prior contributory discussions on an individual function (*e.g.*, economic) or country by a set of specialists on that function or country. But, as a substitute for the real testing of instruments, the development of comprehensive sets of alternative

[2]Reference is especially to the reports of the Rand Corporation's four rounds in "political gaming," to the work of Harold Guetzkow in political "simulation" at Northwestern University and to the political gaming at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

plans and actual two-or-more team gaming, they are utterly inadequate.

The cold war "weapon systems" that this country must counter are not the simple "cultural" and propagandist agencies that were used as political means of influence in the past. A military conqueror in ancient times would spread his country's representatives, institutions, practices and ideas into the territory he had conquered, in order to insure his continued dominance over it. Under modern European nationalism, these means of influence have been exercised over *un*conquered countries for the purpose of extending national political power, if not of "softening up" the area to facilitate military dominance. More recently, Nazism, Fascism and imperialistic Communism have exploited this type of propagandist and "cultural" approach.

Accompanying this diversified battery of influences, the Communists for four decades have elaborated their conspiratorial "organizational weapon," the world-wide Communist Party. In country after country it has been the key force in the new social and psychological cold war weapon system. Its methodically planned yet flexible programs and operations, using long-tested techniques, proceed stage by stage into quasi-military and then full military control.

In addition, the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency's Chief, Allen Dulles, early in 1958 gave warning about another newly expanded cold war weapon system. The means upon which we have been relying in order to make up for our lack of the "organizational weapon," namely, an assortment of economic gifts and loans, has been so perfected, exploited and speeded up by the U.S.S.R. that it has become, in his considered opinion, "the most serious challenge this country has ever faced in time of peace."[3]

It is clear that the world-wide cold war today consists of the use of *the entire repertoire of social forces as weapons and weapon systems*. It is also clear that the means and methods used in this cold war have become increasingly diversified, intricate and menacing. What has *not* been clear except to close observers is that for forty years the components of the Communists' present cold war weapon systems, from the smallest to the largest, have been developed with the utmost theorizing, testing and planning, under arbitrary (and sometimes temperamental) direction. This has involved not merely the testing of components in hundreds of individual cases, but the intense examination and criticism of the tests, the utilization of the components in subsequent cold-war situations and in combinations of cold and hot war situations where available, the further re-examination and re-criticism of the outcomes, and finally the application and transfer of the weapons components and systems to other places on the cold-and-hot war fronts. The lessons learned in China from 1919 to 1925 and in the succeeding hot-and-cold war of the Nationalist-Communist revolution of 1926-27 are a case in point. After being intensely criticized, they were utilized not merely during 1927-49 in China itself so far as "objective conditions" permitted, but from the mid-1920's on, with modifications and developments, in countries all over the world, including Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. In short, the Communists have their own elaborate counterpart of theory and practice to any "wargaming the cold war" we may devise.

Wargaming is not magic. It is hard work. While at times it requires alertness and quick thinking, it can be rendered not merely useless but misleading by amateurish, hasty or careless planning and checking. Many things can and must be said about the planning, actual conduct and follow-up of any given cold war game. Here, only four will be mentioned.

First, the *over-all purposes* of each

[3]April 28, 1958 *The New York Times,* April 29, 1958.

team must be considered (*e.g.*, world peace, in the case of a red-white-and-blue team, and world domination, in the case of a red-and-yellow team). Unless both the over-all purposes of each team and its subsidiary or intermediary and immediate objectives (even where "illogical" or only implicit) are clarified for each cold-wargame, the influence and effects of a given weapon, weapon system or move simply cannot be evaluated. Since this clarification implies and therefore requires the projection of definitive alternate cold-war policies, it may have far-reaching consequences for international policy planning. Second, based on the contrast between fact-finding and policy making, a distinction should be made between historical facts and generalized trends on the one hand, and policies for action on the other. The former, obviously, require historical and scientific methods of investigation; the latter entail intuitive and/or arbitrary devising and choosing of optional lines of action. Even so, the entire complexes and settings of the latter (in the case of the red-white-and-blue team), should be subject to strict logic and careful testing against all relevant data. In short, the "intuitive and arbitrary" decision-making processes should be made as explicit and solidly based as possible. Third, each team and/or the umpires should indicate when they use "experts" for functions in which the

latter have their expertise, and when they use the hunches of these specialists for functions in which they do not have such expertise. Otherwise, any given gaming exercise may not provide a safe precedent for any real cold war endeavor, where presumably experts are employed for all possible functions. Fourth, in any cold-wargame it may be found that the facts, trends and generalizations needed are not available or have not been derived from acceptable data. Where this is so, it is obvious that a subsequent, if not simultaneous, program of research must be undertaken. In the present status of knowledge about world peoples and their relationships, a continual gaming program would be unthinkable without an accompanying program of pertinent research.

On the basis of such cumulative experience in two-or-more team wargaming of the cold-war, a variety of cold war weapons and weapon systems and different specific strategies and tactics may well be developed that will permit the United States to overcome the advantages the U.S.S.R. has garnered from its forty years of experience and its world-wide network of supporting representatives.

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ON THE COVER: "Wargaming" (cf. the article by Maurice Price, above) is not a new concept. On the cover is a small-scale reproduction of the "Game of Fortifications or of War," printed in France in 1812. Playing on much the same principles as in contemporary "Monopoly," the gamesters attempted to capture Metz, through strategic preparations, military actions and the capture of fortifications.

This game, with many others from the fourteenth through nineteenth centuries, is reproduced in *I Giochi di Dadi d'Azzardo e di Passatempo dei Gentiluomini e dei Pirati* (Milan: C. M. Lerici Editore, 1958), a beautifully prepared work on the lore of such diversions. These dealt with many subjects other than war. One, *"Chemin de la Crois, ou Recreation Sprituelle,"* dating from 1640, might well be called "spiritual gaming," thus complementing Mr. Price's argument. Query: Why has no one yet developed the science of "spiritual gaming"?

Administrative Agency Reactions to Court Decisions

The "rule of law" ideology assumes that administrative agencies are passive objects of court supervision, which probes administrative agency action to see whether it accords with constitutional and legal norms. In fact, administrative agencies can react to court interference with a range of chosen actions.

Most contemporary literature in political science, law and public administration discusses the interaction between administrative agencies and courts as a mono-directional process in which administrative agencies serve as more-or-less passive objects of court interference with their activities. Although this image expresses some of the assumptions of the classical "rule of law" ideology, in reality administrative agencies have a large range of choices of action *vis-à-vis* court interference with their activity. We need to examine the main modes of action open to administrative agencies in their interaction with courts, and of the variables influencing the administrative agencies' choice of the line of action to adopt. Only thus may we obtain a realistic view of the interaction between administrative agencies and courts, and of the role of judicial oversight as a means for controlling and shaping administrative action.

There are two primary levels of reaction by administrative agencies to court interference: reaction to the concrete decision of the court in the case before it, and reaction to the new rule of law promulgated in the *ratio decidendi* of the decision.

When the court renders a clear order to the administrative agency to act in the determined case in a defined way, the administrative agency has little discretion, unless retroactive legislation is constitutionally and politically feasible. But often, the courts remand cases to the administrative agencies with instructions to reconsider them in the light of the ruling set down by the court, for example, rulings designating that a speci-

fic official must exercise his discretion, set down a rule of procedure to be followed by the agency, or establish a substantive rule of law to be applied by the agency. In such cases the administrative agency can either genuinely reconsider the case and decide it *de nova* in accordance with the ruling of the court, or the administrative agency can engage in purely formal observance of the ruling of the court while in fact leaving its earlier decision unchanged.

From the general point of view, the second dimension of administrative agency reaction to court action, *i.e.*, administrative agency reaction to the new rule of law promulgated by the court, is much more important. Here we can distinguish at least four possible modes of reaction by the administrative agency:

(1) Full adjustment of administrative agency behavior to the decision of the court. This is the administrative agency reaction expected by the ideology of the "rule of law" and frequently presupposed by contemporary literature.

(2) Partial adjustment of administrative agency behavior to the decision of the court, *e.g.*, giving a limited interpretation to the *ratio decidendi* of the court decision.

(3) Evasive action designed to ignore or minimize the impact of the court decision. The administrative agency can in fact ignore the rule of law set down by the court, hoping to win in another case or — by exerting pressure on the other parties, compromising, etc. — prevent similar cases from reaching the court; the administrative agency can also change its rules of procedure in a

way designed to change the whole setting.

(4) Counteraction designed to overcome the court decision, such as appeal to a higher court (if there is one), efforts to bring a "test case" under circumstances such that the court might be expected to overrule its previous decision, appeal to the legislature for corrective legislation, delegated legislative corrective activity, and so on.

Counteraction to court interference can also take a more general form, not limited to a particular ruling, for example, efforts to limit the scope of judicial review and to grant the administrative agencies immunity against court interference.

The choice by the administrative agency among the various reactions to court interference is influenced by many variables. Among them are:

(1) The formal authority of the courts, the administrative agency and the legislature. The greater the formal authority of the courts, the less likely is the administrative agency to engage in evasive acts or counteraction. If the courts have constitutional review powers, the legislature's ability to forestall court interference with administrative agencies is more limited, closing this avenue of counteraction by administrative agencies, and so on.

(2) The relative social prestige of the administrative agency and the courts. The stronger the relative social prestige of the courts, the more hesitant the administrative agency will be to evade court action and the less likely is the legislature to help the administrative agency in counteracting court interference.

(3) The image of the courts held by the administrative agency. If the administrative agency believes that the judges understand the real issues, realize what administrative problems are involved and sympathize with the agency's objectives, the administrative agency will be more inclined to follow the ruling

of the courts.

(4) The value-patterns and training of agency officials. When officials are law-oriented or law-trained, they will tend to follow court rulings more closely than when they are oriented and trained to the agency-goal.

(5) The administrative significance of the court ruling. If in fact the rule set down by the court frustrates the action of the administrative agency and prevents achievement of the goals of the agency, the administrative agency will tend to evade or counter the court decisions.

These are only some illustrations of the variables shaping the reaction of administrative agencies to court action. It is rather surprising that relatively little attention has been paid to the investigation of administrative agency reaction to court action. The general tendency has been to examine the rules evolved by courts and to discuss the importance of judicial oversight for preserving the supremacy of law, as contrasted with the need to grant administrative agencies the freedom of action to achieve their legitimate goals. The belated recognition in Anglo-American literature of administrative law as a distinct field of law, the dearth of students familiar with both law and the pragmatic and dynamic approach to the study of politics, the tendency of modern students of the administrative process to under-estimate the importance of formal and legal factors — these are some of the reasons that may explain the relative neglect of the study of this problem. On the other hand, full exploration of the interaction between administrative agencies and courts depends on recognition of the active role of administrative agencies and on full investigation of the reaction of administrative agencies to court action. Various research methods can be used for investigating this area. Intensive case studies on one hand and comparative research on the other might provide the

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detailed, monographic data and the macroscopic, inclusive view — both of which are essential for full exploration of the problem. Because of the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the phenomena under examination — which are closely related to various social, psychological, cultural, legal and political factors — an interdisciplinary approach is needed for their investigation.

A realistic and dynamic view of the interaction between administrative agen-cies and courts and the factors shaping it can make a real contribution to our understanding of the division of work and interdependency between the various political organs and of the real working of the division of powers. It might also have important implications to the making of public policy.

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An Introduction to Logical Models

Models are inventions that, having worked well in economics, may make major contributions to our knowledge of the political world. There is, how-ever, no presumption that models are a good in themselves. Like man's other tools, they must be judged on their utility. Their assumptions, reasoning and conclusions are analyzed.

Models of the type that dominate economics are beginning to appear in political science. The average political scientist seems to face this phenomenon with a mixture of antagonism, trepidation and misunderstanding. The trepidation is certainly justified; if models become important in the political area then political scientists will have to learn several branches of mathematics with which they are usually unfamiliar. It is the purpose of this brief essay to clear up the mis-understanding by explaining the nature of the models, and it is hoped that this will also reduce the antagonism.

The first thing to remember about mathematical or logical models is that they are artifacts, things that human be-ings invent. They are easily and readily produced in infinite quantities by the use of simple logical procedures. There should, therefore, be no presumption that a given model is in any way superior to other types of reasoning. One model may be a tool of very great power in under-standing a particular field; another may simply be inapplicable to reality. Each model must be judged on its own merits, and only those that are helpful are worth much time or effort.

The model itself consists of a rigidly accurate chain of reasoning. The differ-ence between such models and ordinary analytical writing lies simply in the word "rigidly." *The Federalist* is a good example of ordinary analysis, which I shall from now on call discursive reason-ing, and Euclid's *Geometry* can be taken as an example of the rigidly accurate type of reasoning that we find in models. These models have certain characteristics that the political scientist may recall from his high school geometry. In the first place, it is not possible, without error, to reject part of the model without re-jecting the whole. You cannot say, "I agree with Euclid's axioms and most of his theorems seem O.K., but I don't be-lieve that the interior angles of a triangle equal two right angles." Once you have

accepted the axioms you have accepted all of the theorems, and a disproof of one theorem is a disproof of the whole system. Another important aspect of such a system is that it cannot be summarized. It consists of a long chain of individual steps, each one of which is necessary for all the succeeding ones. If you cut out even one step, you no longer have a rigidly logical structure, but an example of discursive reasoning.

A great many scholars seem to think that such models have great value in the physical sciences but cannot be applied to the study of man. Usually such objections stem from a complete misunderstanding of the physical sciences, but I do not wish to discuss the philosophical issue here. I should simply like to point out that such models have, in fact, been successfully used in the social studies. The oldest of the models with which I am familiar is the one from which Gresham's law was deduced. We now regard this as primitive and obvious, and, in fact, we now get a more sophisticated version of the law as a deduction from another, more general, model, but no one doubts the truth of the law. Through history, both before and after Gresham's time, governments have again and again adopted the policies to which the law applies. In each case, the effect predicted by the law has followed. If models have no application to human affairs, how is this to be explained? Surely, it is not simply a gigantic chain of coincidences.

Researchers in the social sciences, though they may argue against use of abstract models, frequently make use of statistics, one of the purest examples of such a model. Statistics may be used through equations that are applicable to problems in the social sciences and, concurrently, equally helpful in a problem in nuclear physics. Laws that describe the behavior of roulette wheels are also found to describe the behavior of human beings. If the abstract model of statistics is acceptable in the social sciences, surely the much less abstract models used in economics are not barred. If the

method is valid in economics, why not also in other fields of human studies?

To analyze the models, we may discuss them in three groups, assumptions, reasoning and conclusions. Assumptions may be of two types, those that are descriptive of the real world and those that are nondescriptive. "True" assumptions are frequently truisms. For example, in economics, two important assumptions are that there is more than one factor of production, and that it is impossible to predict the future with perfect accuracy. Such platitudes may impress the unwary reader negatively, yet they have been the support of useful theories.

Non-descriptive assumptions usually are palpably untrue and cause considerable trouble for the inexperienced scholar. Simplicity is the key to these models. We must concentrate on a part of reality in order to comprehend gradually, but the model of the part will necessarily differ from the whole and the simplyfing assumptions eliminate the part of reality that is not to be studied in the model. Probably the most famous of such assumptions is the "perfect knowledge" used in so many economic models. The process by which knowledge is transmitted through a society is a complex one, and the economists using this assumption wish to study something else. The transmission process is thus simply assumed away. In reality, a change in price of raw material will not be known to all manufacturers at the instant it is made, but will take some finite period of time to become generally known. A model that implicitly assumes instantaneous information transmission is obviously "unrealistic." It will predict occurrences with definite errors in timing, so we should use "perfect knowledge" models of assumption only in deducing what will happen, never in deducing when it will happen.

The scholar devotes much time and attention to the assumptions of the new model he is studying. Firstly, reasoning in the body of the model will depend so heavily upon the assumptions that

they will normally be repeated a very large number of times, so that by the time he finishes reading it he will know them well even if he skips the first chapter. Secondly, it is impossible to tell much about a completely new model from the assumptions. Eventually, after reviewing the reasoning, the scholar may want to go back and examine the assumptions carefully, but first he should become fully acquainted with the logical structure of the model.

The rigid reasoning, which distinguishes a model from discursive writing, is simply a carefully worked out chain of logic. Human beings, unfortunately, are prone to err, and model builders are human beings, so models sometimes contain logical errors. Einstein once published an important paper containing an error in algebra, and less exalted minds are apt to make even worse mistakes. The reasoning should, therefore, be examined with care. Since model builders use diverse mathematical materials, this requires considerable mathematical knowledge. Geometric models are very common, simple algebra and calculus almost as much so, and matrix algebra and topology have been used. The student who cannot examine reasoning of this sort critically must simply take the results on faith. Fortunately, most models use only rather elementary applications of these branches of mathematics, but anyone who wishes to deal with such models must learn some mathematics.

In the social sciences there has been a recent trend toward the use of sympathetic magic in an effort to become "scientific." Books are printed in the form traditional for mathematics text books, and equations and diagrams will be strewn through the work without much regard for their logical relevance, clearly in order to give a "scientific" appearance to the work. Needless to say, this has nothing to do with model building. What counts is the tightness of the logic.

A logical structure that has more than a very few fundamental assumptions is normally infinite in nature. It is possible to continue thinking up new implications indefinitely. The conclusions, therefore, are not the ultimate ends of the reasoning process, but simply places where we choose to stop. If there are no mistakes in the reasoning of the model, these conclusions must be true within it, but that does not prove they are true about the real world. The only way to tell whether the model has any use in dealing with the real world is to see whether it gives results consistent with the real world. Generally, a model will have a large number of implications for the real world, and if any one of these implications can be proved to be untrue, then there is something wrong with the model. If it survives a number of such tests, then we can begin to have confidence in it.

Among the real world implications of the model will be some that the scholar can check instantly against his general knowledge of the world. A model of my construction that will appear shortly implies the existence of loopholes in the income tax laws. I take it that no serious research is necessary to check this point. Other implications of the model can only be regarded as a source of hypotheses for empirical research. Finally, there will be implications that cannot be checked by empirical methods in our present state of knowledge. If the model has survived enough tests so that we have confidence in it, these implications are apt to be its most important aspect, and may be a major contribution to our knowledge. For example, there is no empirical way of demonstrating that living standards would be raised if we repealed our tariffs. We believe this because it is an implication of a well-tested model.

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Student Politics in Latin America

In the case study of the Student Federation of Chile summarized here, data was obtained by interviews with leaders and by the study of documents, covering three separate periods in the federation's history. Organization was considered in two complementary ways; as a set of institutionalized value patterns and ideas, and as a collectivity. The results are generalized to other Latin American student organizations. The author suggests new research on such groups, whose role in events such as Castro's Cuban revolution may have far-reaching impact.

Latin America is one of the few areas where the tradition of militant political activism among university youth is firmly rooted. Since the middle of 1956, when field work on the case study described here was undertaken, five Latin American dictators have been unseated. In at least three of these cases university students were key elements in organizing and sustaining the revolutionary movements that succeeded, against seemingly insurmountable odds, in driving these men from power.[1] In 1958 alone student groups paralyzed municipal transport in Mexico City, rioted in Buenos Aires against changes in the laws governing educational establishments, and stood off a week-long siege by police from within the University in Panama City. The violent student demonstrations that greeted Vice-President Nixon during his tour of Latin America in that same year shocked U. S. public opinion and spurred United States policy makers into a fresh examination of relations with our southern neighbors.

Such violence and drama reveal only one facet of student organization in Latin America. Students make the front pages because their actions vitally affect political developments in the hemisphere. The headlines depict students alternately as heroes, as criminals or terrorists, as petulant malcontents or as the docile tools of subversives. For the journalist, the political analyst and the diplomat, the student is a disturbing and unpre-

dictable factor complicating the day's work; but the attention of the sociologist is drawn by the apparently persistent and recurrent features of student movements in the Latin American university. He seeks to understand the student organization not only as a political institution but as a distinctive social phenomenon — as a particular form of age-homogeneous organization operating within a specialized milieu — the university in Latin America.

Student organizations seem to have a permanent and institutionalized place in Latin American society. What is the nature of their links and co-functions with the university administration, with political parties, with labor unions, with governments? Whence do such groups draw their leadership, their ideology? How generalized is their influence among young people? What form does their organization take? What techniques of political action do they commonly use? To what extent do they become the instruments of better organized or irresponsible forces? How stable are political allegiances formed in university circles? What non-political functions do such youth groups serve for the society at large and for their membership?

RESEARCH APPROACH

First answers to these questions have been sought through what is essentially an analysis of a single case. The re-

[1]Colombia, Pres. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, May 10, 1957; Venezuela, Pres. Marcos Perez Jimenez, January 23, 1958; Cuba, Fulgencio Batista, January 1, 1959.

search went beyond the conventional case study by comparing a specific student organization (the Student Federation of Chile) at three distinct periods in its life, and relating observed changes in its structure and in the personalities of its leaders to broad changes in the society in which the organization existed as well as to a general theory of organizational development.[2] The comparison encompassed the organizational structure of the Student Federation of Chile as it was in 1956 and 1957 and as it was at two critical periods in its past — the first between 1918 and 1922, the second between 1936 and 1940. By strategic choice of the time periods for intensive analysis, the study provided insight into developmental processes within organizations and also gave some grounds for projecting results to other Latin American nations where social conditions now approximate those existing in Chile at the time of the investigation or in the past.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHOD

Interviews with leaders of each period constituted the principal source of data on the organization. These accounts were supplemented and checked by the examination of newspapers, magazines, scrapbooks and other documents.

Organizational structure was conceived in two complementary ways in order to obtain as full a range of data as possible for the comparative analysis. In the first, organizational structure was regarded as a set of *institutionalized value patterns and ideas* — as a set of images shared by those who made up the organization and to varying degrees by others outside it as to what the organization was, who was in it, what its aims were, how they were to be achieved, the meaning of participation and what the organization's relations with external groups was to be.

These dimensions of structure were related in each period to a second level, which conceived the organization as a *collectivity* engaged in the concerted pursuit of a set of goals. At this level the organization was analyzed as a network of people at work in a more or less coordinated fashion on a set of problems. Here was determined what people in varying positions within the student organization were in fact doing from day to day to deal with many of the organization problems noted at the institutional level.

The final broad area covered by interviews was a variety of biographical and attitudinal materials that were regarded as essential to an interpretation of the data on organization, and that also provided some clues about the personalities of the leaders of each time period.

A total of 77 tape-recorded interviews were conducted with present or former leaders and university authorities. The entire executive council for 1956-57 of the Student Federation of Chile (FECH) and a probability sample of the 127 school delegates and presidents were interviewed. For earlier generations it was impossible to obtain systematic samples of this kind. The interviewing effort was accompanied by five months of personal observation of all meetings, demonstrations and other organizational functions.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

The detailed analyses of organizational structures in the three periods revealed the FECH's transition since 1918-1920 from an agitational, politically-focused, charismatic type of movement to an increasingly formalized and somewhat bureaucratized, student-oriented organization. Personality differences among leaders of the three epochs did not emerge as clearly, but some interest-

ing *uniformities* in their backgrounds and attitudes were revealed. The findings may be regarded as conclusive for Chile and suggestive for countries where analogous conditions exist. They may be sketched in summary as follows:

(1) The process of routinization, the stabilization of resources, the acceptance of definite functions and responsibility, the evolution of a managerial rather than an agitational approach, is clear with respect to the student organization's role *within* the university.

(2) There is less continuity, less evidence of success in establishing stable patterns of collective action by students in the political sphere.

(3) The external political role of the student organization is most responsive to larger changes in the society, principally to changes in the balance of power among national parties, but also to broad ideological trends transcending national politics. The university political movement in Chile and elsewhere in Latin America has its place intellectually within the mainstream of modern political trends in thought and action.

(4) Economic and social inequality — the hard frustration of problems that have no foreseeable solutions within the existing social framework — have been a permanent stimulus to student political action.

(5) The penetration of the student organization by political parties has meant on the one hand the displacement of students from true leadership functions outside the university, and on the other, the manipulation of the student organization by the political opposition in order to harass and embarrass governments.

(6) The student organization takes an autonomous, out-going political role chiefly when the forces of political protest are weak, disorganized or persecuted. The repeated demonstrations of the potency of *el pueblo* with the leadership of students, intellectuals and other civilians against the armed force of dictators serves to support the image of the university and the *student* organization as the ultimate bulwarks of fredom and the sources of trustworthy political leadership in times of political crisis.

(7) The fundamental conditions that produced the distinctive forms of organization observed in the three time periods in Chile can be observed contemporaneously in other Latin American countries.[3]

(8) Radical shifts occurred in institutional forms without major changes in formal organization. The student organization changed more in its *ideas* about what it wanted to do and how to do it than in the formal disposition of organizational lines or in the informal patterns of day to day activities.

(9) Over and above the party commitments and the apathy often encountered in student ranks, there exists a set of canons governing and inspiring student action. These include the courage to have and to defend a point of view on fundamental issues, loyalty in friendship, a readiness for self-sacrifice, love of country, hatred of dictators and distrust of the military, a sentimental identification with the working classes and solidarity with the youth of other Latin American countries.

(10) The student organization is a male institution manned and led by middle and lower middle class youths with a disproportionate representation in the leadership of young men from the provinces, of students with foreign-born parents, and of those whose families are divided or broken.

[3] At this writing, the Cuban student organization comes closer to the rebellious charismatic movement of the 1920 period in Chile. Cuban students had their own revolutionary force independent of Fidel Castro's, and even after victory they strove to maintain the autonomy of their movement. The student organization in Venezuela, where a democratic, Leftist regime has taken power after long years of dictatorship, approaches closely the situation of the Popular Frontists in the University of Chile in 1940. Many aspects of the contemporary situation in Chile are reproduced in Argentina, where, however, the matter is complicated by the recent change of regime and the efforts to eliminate the influence of Peronists in the University.

(11) The social backgrounds of student leaders of all three generations, the patterns of family relationships, their religious experience, attitudes toward friendship and orientation toward politics show a remarkable degree of consistency.

(12) There is no evidence in study findings that student political action in any generation represented to an important degree an avenue for working out emotional problems stemming from psychological maladjustment. The radicalism of students in Chile appears to be rational and principled rather than pathological.

FURTHER RESEARCH

This study was specifically undertaken to open up a new area to systematic investigation. The multiple approach to the analysis of organization that has been applied was adopted with the hope of exposing as many facets as possible of the student organization. The fundamental objective was to throw light on the functions and modes of operation of a kind of organization that appears to have a critical role in the political life of a large number of nations.

Further research needed in this field can be conveniently inventoried by moving from the study embracing the largest to that covering the smallest social unit.

(1) The Chilean student organization has been characterized on the basis of this research as essentially democratic in practice and leadership. It has been stated that the motivations of student leaders are non-pathological; student political action has been described as fundamentally a rational reaction to real problems. Cross national comparisons are needed to determine whether these findings hold true for other Latin American countries or are peculiar to the Chilean setting. Do student movements throughout the hemisphere in fact share beliefs and organizational practices that they make operative within the limita-

tions of their national setting?

(2) University students represent a tiny fraction of the young people in Latin America. They also represent only a fraction of the politically active and organized youth in each country. The political behavior, attitudes, and functions of university youth cannot be satisfactorily assessed without careful study of youth political organization outside the university.

(3) Students from the Catholic universities in Latin America have occasionally joined in mass movements sparked by the lay universities. More commonly they have remained aloof from political movements or even ranged themselves directly against other university students. This has usually been explained as a simple matter of economic and class interest, and may be just that.

Still it is important to compare the forms of student organization in one setting as against another and to attempt to connect differences in political attitudes to concrete differences in background and experience.

(4) Systematic comparisons of leaders, rank-and-file participants and the inactive among students could not be undertaken in this study. Yet much of what has been said about student politics must remain tentative in the absence of knowledge about the specific ways in which leaders differ from less active students.

The execution of such studies in a number of Latin American countries would provide some solid ground for conclusions about the place of youth in politics in that region. Perhaps more importantly, such investigation would reveal patterns of political socialization in a culture that has been striving against great odds for many decades to achieve democracy in politics.

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THE GAME BAG

SMALL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RESEARCH: PROD readers should be aware of the research grants disbursed by the Small Business Administration to groups doing studies of problems of small business in their State. Oblivious to the facts of research but attuned to the politics of federalism, $40,000 was allocated this year to each State, regardless of population and number of universities. Maybe our readers in Alaska would like to apply, however, and we should like to help them out. You are welcome to the following idea:

THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ON THE DETAILS OF A SMALL BUSINESS

The Situation: All levels of government service regulate and tax business in many different ways. Small business reacts to this impact differently than does big business. The total impact is unknown and yet a matter of great importance in view of constant pleas and efforts to make government act to save small business from destruction.

The Questions: In how many distinct direct and indirect ways does government affect the day-to-day operation of a small business—to hinder or help it? How much in time and money does a small business pay for such regulation and services? Is there a psychological problem involved: does uncertainty, anxiety about unknown or potential transgressions of rules affect the businessman's day-to-day viewpoint, his attitude toward government and democracy, his attitude toward his clients and workers? How does the income tax schedule affect his time and decisions?

The Method: The research team would engage the cooperation of the owners of several small manufacturing or processing enterprises employing from two to fifteen workers. Selecting certain time periods, the study would record the full details of the everyday conduct of the business in order to trace all contacts, time spent, communications, adjustments and reactions between the enterprise and the government.

General Role of Study: This study, combining techniques of political science, history, economics and psychology, may give a partial answer to one of the crucial questions of modern society: what is happening to small business? Its intensity should give a more realistic picture than that provided by most available studies.

Duration and Cost: Presentation of findings should be made in one year. Predicted costs include: $3,000 for directing personnel on a part-time basis, $600 for the typing of records and reports, and $400 for miscellaneous expenses. Total, $4,000 per business.

PAULINE YOUNG'S Social Research TEXT: Lewis Dexter has a good point to make in a recent letter:

"It's rather a pity that Russett's article [PROD III, 1] does not include a discussion of the fourth standard text on social research methods, which is definitely superior to the three he mentions in several ways. Pauline V. Young's *Social Research*, current edition, is superior to Lazarsfeld in variety of methods which can in fact be used by political scientists, from some standpoints better than any of the others bibliographically, much better written than any of the others except Jahoda, and, partly in consequence, much superior as a teachable text, and I would suspect much more inclined or likely to make the student feel that method is an intrinsic part of social science rather than a separate body of doctrine than any of the others."—Sincerely, *Lewis A. Dexter.*

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES, THE HAGUE: This joint creation by ten Dutch universities offers an important kind of interdisciplinary program leading to leadership in various fields of public service. It is post-graduate. There are a two-year Course in the Social Sciences, a seven-month Course in Social Welfare Policy, a six-month Course in Public Administration, a six-month Course in Economic Planning and National Accounting, and a four-month Course in Comprehensive Planning. The Institute offers its staff, faculty and students chances to do research in connection with the teaching programs. It is especially active in research on social change and economic development. All classes are conducted in English.

THE POLITICAL STUDIES PROGRAM AT NORTH CAROLINA: Professor Donald R. Matthews is directing a promising variant of the civic participation programs popular in recent years. He will soon describe it in *PROD*, but we wish to cite it for its sophisticated attempt at uniting laboratory, field research and political action, the kind of coordination that *PROD* regards as the unique contribution that political science departments can make to citizenship.

Valuing Freedom

To have meaningful discussion of freedom requires an agreed definition of freedom in non-valuational terms. A number of hypotheses concerning interpersonal freedom are developed, most of which can be tested empirically using psychological, political or historical evidence. All may be considered rules of choices — "rules stipulating conditions under which it is rational for anyone to assign positive (or negative) value to some particular freedom relationship."

"Freedom" tends to be used by everyone to refer to many different things that he happens to consider socially valuable. Whenever this word functions in a laudatory way, it follows by definition that whatever it stands for is intrinsically good. Anybody's value-commitment to liberty then becomes tautological—and vacuous. Meaningful disagreement about the value of freedom evidently presupposes an agreed definition of freedom in non-valuational terms. To "make political theory more operational," the notion will here stand for specific relationships of interaction between persons or groups, as in the expression: "With respect to *B*, *A* is free to do *x*."

The concept of interpersonal freedom is fruitful in several respects. (a) It can be defined in purely descriptive (*i.e.*, non-normative) terms; hence statements about liberty in this sense can be objectively tested by reference to empirical evidence and are thus true independently of the speaker's own valuations about liberty. (b) This analysis is well in line with the current trend in the behavioral sciences to interpret its fundamental concepts as interaction relationships. It then becomes possible to connect interpersonal freedom with such other key terms of political science as influence, power, or authority (these connections turn out to be rather intricate). (c) In most political writings, "freedom" does in fact refer to such kinds of interpersonal relationships, although the author is all too often unaware of this. (d) Interpersonal freedom covers situations of both independence and dependence. Indeed, *A* may be, with respect to *B*, free to do *x*, either because *B* has no power to limit *A's* freedom in this respect (*e.g.*, *B* are the subjects of dictator *A*; or, *A* and *B* are independent nations), or because *B*

permits A to do x (A are the subjects of ruler B).

If "freedom" is taken in the inter-personal sense, the common allegation that freedom is a universal value is no longer trivial; it is not even true. Only if certain specific conditions are fulfilled is one inclined to prize one's own freedom to act in a certain way or to want others to be free in that respect. By listing some of these necessary conditions, I shall formulate some tentative hypotheses about value-attitudes toward interpersonal freedom.

(1) Under what circumstances is any actor A likely to value the fact that he himself is, with respect to some other actor B, free to perform some kind of action x? First of all, it must be possible for A to do x. (One may be unable to do something, yet free to do so with respect to others.) Most unemployed want above all to have the opportunity to earn a living but are indifferent to their being officially free to work. It is the possibility that they lack, not the freedom that they have, which matters to them.

(2) A is unlikely to value his being free to do x, unless he values *doing* x. If I have no desire to go abroad, I am indifferent to my being officially free to secure a passport (whatever my views may be as to whether government should leave others free to travel abroad).

(3) Whenever A is free to do x, there exists at least one alternative action y that A is also free to perform (y may consist of not doing x; e.g., freedom to vote implies freedom to abstain). Being left free by B to do *either* x or y is likely to be valuable to A only if both doing x *and* doing y appeal to A, and about equally. If A greatly prefers x to y or y to x, his being free to do either x or y will be of no interest to him; in many cases he would not mind being required to do what he would choose to do anyhow (e.g., compulsory education). To value being free to do something is to value having the choice

between doing it or not doing it (or doing something else instead). Freedom to work (or to remain idle) is prized neither by those who cannot find work (cf. *supra*, [1]) nor by those who have no difficulty in finding employment; the latter will normally choose to work for a living rather than to remain idle and starve. It is only as an alternative to prohibition to work or forced labor that freedom to work becomes an important goal. Given a series of alternatives with respect to which one is free, the value one assigns to one's freedom is an increasing function of: (a) the number of alternatives included in the choice set (among which one is undecided); (b) the similarity in value of the elements of the choice set; (c) the value one attaches to each item of the choice set.

(4) Actors may actually disvalue their own freedom, even though all the previous conditions are fulfilled. People often prefer to follow a prescribed course of action (e.g., to obey traffic lights) rather than to be free — and compelled by circumstances — to decide for themselves among competing alternatives. Such a negative attitude may sometimes, but does not always, constitute an "escape from freedom" into slavish submission to authority. My being free in a certain respect matters to me only if I value the act of selecting one course of action from my choice set.

(5) However, we do not always desire that a freedom that we have, but for which we do not care, be limited by others. Sometimes we would value that same freedom highly if it were taken away from us. Protestants in a country where freedom of religion is protected do not care much about their own freedom to worship "as they please," unless they were to contemplate a change of religion (cf. *supra*, [3]). But let Protestantism be outlawed, and freedom of worship would raise to the top of their scale of values. Many Protestants are equally opposed to a

Protestant state religion, even though their own behavior would not thereby be modified. We often value our being free to act in a certain way because we resent being compelled to do what we would choose to do anyhow.

(6) So far, I have examined certain conditions under which an actor tends to value his own interpersonal freedom. However, he may oppose others having the very kind of freedom that he arrogates to himself. Conversely, he may be indifferent to his own freedom and yet desire that this same liberty be granted to others than himself, or to everybody including himself. Someone who is so firmly attached to his own faith that he does not consider adopting another may nevertheless be a champion of the general principle of freedom of religion for all. If so, he implicitly prefers the coexistence of various religions to the monopoly of his own. In general, the less important it is to me that all act in some specific way, the higher do I prize their being left free to act in one way or in another; and the more value I attach to a certain goal, the more will I insist that others be forced to contribute to its realization.

(7) When some particular freedom relationship is held desirable, it is usually valued as a means to other ends rather than merely as an aim in itself (e.g., periodic "free" elections as a means of preventing any one group from monopolizing power; "civil liberties" as a means to individual "self-realization"). As to limitations of freedom, they are hardly ever valued for their own sake. If I support a piece of legislation, it is for some purpose which requires that the freedom of those to whom the law would apply be limited, including possibly my own.

(8) Every conceivable political system constitutes a network of both freedom and unfreedom relationships (e.g., the right of free speech implies the duty not to interfere with the exercise of this right; the dictator's freedom corresponds to the unfreedom of his subjects). To value any freedom is to value implicitly its concomitant unfreedom relationships.

(9) Two kinds of freedom relationships may conflict with each other (e.g., A's freedom to join any fraternity and B's freedom to "choose his associates"). To "value freedom" in such contexts is to ask: whose freedom ranks higher, and who should have the power to decide whose freedom is to prevail? A particular freedom relationship may be incompatible with some goal other than freedom (e.g., "freedom of contract" with "general welfare"; freedom of speech with national security). There seems to be no general way in which such conflicts tend to be resolved. The evaluator may either want to maximize one goal at the expense of the other or to reach a compromise between both.

Statements (1) to (7) could be tested empirically in the light of the relevant psychological, political or historical evidence. Perhaps it would be more fruitful to consider them all ([1] to [9]) as rules of choice — rules stipulating conditions under which it is rational for anyone to assign positive (or negative) value to some particular freedom relationship, given his own overall framework of preferences, whatever they may be. We may assume, as do the welfare economists, that man's behavior tends to be rational, if rationality merely signifies his disposition to maximize his specific goals in relation to his general preferences. To the extent that the assumption of rationality in this limited sense is warranted, and to the extent that these rules are rules of rational choice, they will yield empirical hypotheses that explain and predict (and not merely describe) man's value-behavior in the area of interpersonal freedom.

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Job Mobility between Government and other Social Structures

Professions and occupations, as well as government, are considered as hierarchic structures of statuses. Job switching between professions and government positions can be analyzed in terms of status sequences. Computer simulation is ideal for such studies. Some key problems of political theory depend for their solution upon knowledge of patterns of occupational interchange. This article originally appeared, in somewhat different form, as Publication No. A-289 of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.

During recent years a number of separate lines of work have been pursued in political behavior, sociology and the methodology of social research that might now be advantageously synthesized in a new research program to identify the patterns and consequences of the flow of personnel between political structures and other structures in a social system. It has long been recognized that the social origins of governmental personnel affect the legitimacy and policies of government. Some political and social theorists, such as Aristotle and Vilfredo Pareto, have made the flow of leadership among government and other social structures one of their central themes in explaining the forms, actions and changes of governments.

In recent years some empirical case studies have shown the crucial effects that changes in personnel recruitment have brought upon the policies of particular government agencies. Examples would be Philip Selznick's *TVA and the Grass Roots* (1949) and David Apter's *The Gold Coast in Transition* (1955). By appropriate combinations of theory and empirical research, we might now be able to specify how all of the significant structures within a social system function in supplying personnel to government, the types of personnel who are supplied in this way, the statuses among which such flow takes place, and the consequences of these patterns for the performance of the government, for the operation of each of the other social structures and for individual careers.

In political science the contributing line of research has been the recent series of studies on the social background of decision-makers. Many of these projects have identified the occupations from which officials have been recruited, and the historical changes in the sources. Joseph Schlesinger, in an article entitled "Lawyers and American Politics" (*Midwest J. of Pol. Sci.*, Vol. 1, May 1957, pp. 26-38), has taken this work further by showing the various career sequences through a series of offices culminating in the governorship and by indicating how differences in sequence depend on the private occupation from which recruitment is made. Theodore Lowi demonstrates how some changes in the social system and in the political system in a city create corresponding changes in the personnel pipelines from which government officeholders are recruited (in *Political Executives — A Study of Mayors' Cabinets in New York From Van Wyck to Wagner* [Dissertation in Political Science, Yale University, 1959]).

Meanwhile, potentially complementary work is being done in occupational sociology. Research on career lines within individual occupations has begun to identify the reasons why the holders of one job change or maintain either their organizational location or their vocational category and the reasons why changers select their new positions. Examples would be *The Academic Marketplace* by Theodore Caplow and Reece J. McGee (1958), and William A. Glaser's "Internship Appointments of Medi-

cal Students" (*Admin. Sci. Q.*, Vol. 4, Dec. 1959). Social theorists such as Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton have set forth pertinent ideas relating to the concept of status, the organization of status sequences and the interrelationships of social structures within a total social system.

The foregoing lines of theory and research might be combined in the following way. A government may be conceived of as a hierarchic structure of statuses. Various professions and occupations may also be considered as separate status structures. Individual careers consist of sequences from one status to another in each structure, and the velocity and height of each individual's movement depend on his success in contributing to the functional requirements of the structure. No structure is completely enclosed, but personnel are continually entering and leaving at various levels. Government is related to each of the other structures in such a way that some personnel switch over from certain occupational statuses to certain designated governmental statuses, while other personnel move from other government statuses to corresponding statuses in the other structures. Thus a kind of personnel flow back and forth occurs among the several governmental and occupational structures.

Some interconnections between the legal profession and the government bureaucracy illustrate close relationships between an occupational structure and the government. Some of these connections function to promote upward career mobility for individuals. At various places in both structures there exist switching points at which upward mobile bureaucrats may switch into the private legal profession, and other switching points at which mobile lawyers may switch into the government bureaucracy. An upward mobile lawyer may bypass bottlenecks in the legal profession by switching over into the bureaucracy and then switching back into the legal profession at a higher

status than he may have attained by promotion within the profession alone. For example, a young law school graduate who cannot get into a major firm might do well to join the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Federal Trade Commission or the Interstate Commerce Commission. Having learned the intricacies of these subjects, having learned the skills of practice before judges and commissions and having made useful personal contacts in Washington, he might then be hired by a major law firm at a senior level. In view of the large American law firm's prominent position in Republican politics, the same lawyer then might switch back into the bureaucracy at a very high level when a new Republican administration is inaugurated in Washington or in a State capital. In addition to such shuttling back and forth, an ambitious person with limited opportunities in his occupation might switch permanently into the bureaucracy, or an ambitious person with limited mobility expectations in the bureaucracy might switch permanently into the occupation.

Many other types of status sequences exist beside those that represent upward career mobility. For example, switches may occur between statuses at the same level. In addition, the absence of status transfers sometimes is significant. For example, the American medical profession now almost never supplies personnel for non-medical government positions.

In the development of a theory about the patterns of personnel flow, one problem is to discover the conditions regulating the frequency of switches between a specified pair of statuses. Information of this kind may be built up by empirical research on cases of switching and non-switching. Such work can be based on recent developments in "reason analysis" in the methodology of social research. A list of sources appears in Charles Kadushin's article on

"Individual Decisions to Undertake Psychotherapy" (*Admin. Sci. Q.*, Vol. 3, Dec. 1958, p. 383). Questionnaires can be designed that would ask the non-switching status occupants, the switchers and the hiring officers for all the pertinent reasons for their respective decisions. For example, someone transferring from a private occupation into a government office would be queried as to his information on the government office, his own motivations, his gratifications and strains in his prior job, his expectations with regard to the government office, the pertinent social influences that affected him, the opportunities and barriers that intervened between him and the government office, etc. Certain responses might recur often and might seem, therefore, to be determined by the ways the occupational and government structures are organized. This procedure would identify the institutional forces that govern what types and proportions of people move between specified occupations and government offices. For example, by using sources other than direct questionnaires, I have attempted, in a forthcoming article on "Doctors and Politics," to identify certain institutionalized conditions in the medical profession that produce the low rate of entry into non-medical government offices.

Above all, after describing and explaining the patterns of flow, we would like to find out their consequences for public policy. What kinds of government decisions result from the values and actions of the types of people who enter a particular government status? What changes in government policy are produced by changes in the rate of entry and by changes in the rate of departure for each type of personnel? What functional consequences befall the occupation from the loss of some of its personnel to government and the acquisition of certain other kinds of personnel from government?

Because of the magnitude of the data and the number of simultaneous variables, the complete problem of personnel flow is unmanageable by conventional analytical methods. Fortunately another recent innovation in the methodology of social research can be used. Ours is one of the kinds of macroscopic problems in social system processes that can be approached by means of the language and operations of computer simulation. This technique already is being used to describe and explain the collective behavior of an entire electorate over time, namely, by William N. McPhee and James Coleman, in an article entitled "A Program of Research in 'Mass Dynamics'" (*PROD*, Vol. 1, March 1958, pp. 6-10), and in the former's chapters in a forthcoming book on Congressional voting. The problem of personnel flow among governmental and non-governmental structures resembles national income analysis, which is now also being performed by computer methods.

The inputs and programs of computer simulation could be copied from the actual behavior that has been discovered in samples of real people and real situations by means of conventional questionnaires and by other techniques. The computer then performs realistic operations with this miniature social system. Simulation would produce a great variety of results, depending on the kinds of information and programs that are adopted. For example, it might simply produce descriptions of how the various kinds of career lines involving governmental and non-governmental structures depend upon the motivations and abilities of the given population and upon the opportunity structures provided by various institutions. Simulation might describe the kinds of policy outputs that might be expected from government, according to various types of personnel flow in and out of government. Changes in such policy outputs might be correlated with changes in the kinds of personnel who enter or leave government, and policy changes might be correlated with the redistribution

of personnel resulting from a reorganization of government statuses. Certain realistic processes might be included in the program, such as the expansion or contraction of the government bureaucracy under specified conditions, and their effects upon both the policy output of the government and the outputs of closely related occupations might be traced. The program can include feedback, such that the decisions of government exercise some influence over the

personnel flows in and out of government. Many such subtle processes can be programmed. At present the only practical limitations arise from the present storage capacities of the machines, and further progress on the substantive problem can be achieved as computers continue to be elaborated.

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The Legislator in Underdeveloped Countries

The value structure of the individual legislator and the "collective personality" of the legislature in the new nations can be studied in several ways. After summarizing the position of legislatures in the political process in such countries, the author presents data on the occupations, education and ages of legislators in several countries, and suggests research questions and methods.

Most recently emancipated countries in Asia and Africa are presently struggling to produce a sustained economic development and to build strong national political systems. In most cases some effort is made to achieve these objectives within a democratic political framework.

In view of a long authoritarian tradition of indigenous rulers and colonial powers, the shift in political processes toward representative government understandably proceeds through gradual, step-by-step development. Initial efforts by the new (revolutionary) political leaderships occur along two lines. First, the administrative machinery of the previous authoritarian system is taken over as a whole, but placed under the "control" of a *top layer* of elected officials. Second, a popularly elected legislative assembly is constituted with the main function of controlling the

administrative apparatus through the selection of the chief administrative officials, through the fiscal control of the budget and through the creation of a new legal framework. With only a few exceptions the American presidential system has been rejected in favor of the British parliamentary method. In short, for constitutional purposes the legislature is designed as the primary representative institution, to which the other branches are subordinated.

Although the constitution provides for a powerful legislature, the existing political processes undermine the effectiveness of the individual legislator.

(a) The struggle for independence inevitably produces a few charismatic leaders.

(b) Even after independence, nomination is invariably contingent on the approval of the national heroes and elec-

TABLE I. Occupational Background of Legislators in Selected Countries
(Percentages)

	India [1] 1957-1962	Turkey [2] 1946-1951	Iraq [3] 1958	Pakistan [4] 1956-1958		
				East	West	Total
Landlords, farmers and tribal chiefs	23.1	21.1	49.6	7.5	72.5	40.0
Lawyers	23.5	13.8	32.4	60.0	2.5	31.3
Teachers	4.8	11.4	6.9	7.5	2.5	5.0
Physicians	2.4	11.0	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.5
Civil Servants	2.8	20.4	–	7.5	7.5	7.5
Merchants and Businessmen	10.1	3.4	2.1	5.0	7.5	6.3
Journalists	4.2	–	2.1	–	2.5	1.2
Religious Leaders	0.2	0.4	–	2.5	–	1.2
Military Personnel	0.2	12.0	4.1	–	–	–
Engineers and Scientists	0.6	2.4	0.7	–	–	–
Miscellaneous White Collar	1.2	–	–	5.0	–	2.5
Labor Leaders	3.4	–	–	2.5	–	1.3
Social Workers	7.3	–	–	–	2.5	1.2
Unknown	13.6	2.2	–	–	–	–
Vacant Seats	2.6	1.9	–	–	–	–

1 Government of India, Lok Sabha Secretariat. *Second Lok Sabha Who's Who.* New Delhi: 1957.
2 Government of Turkey, General Directorate of Statistics. *Small Statistical Abstract.* Ankara: 1957, and *Turkiye Yilligi.* Istanbul: 1947. For a more meaningful comparison we have selected the first Turkish parliament elected after a campaign where opposition parties were permitted to participate (1946).
3 Baghdad, *Ash'ab,* May 7, 1958.
4 Government of Pakistan. *Members of Parliament.* Karachi: 1958.

tion depends on the measure to which the candidate succeeds in identifying himself with a national hero, thus sharing in his charisma.

(c) At least during the early phase of independence the legislator has not had any independent political roots in popular support and has been in a manner suspended above the general electorate.

On the other hand, the executive branch continues to enjoy its own independent and effective power base.

(a) There is a traditional inclination among Asians (as well as many other people) to identify government with the bureaucracy.

(b) The power of executive officials is always felt more directly by the individual than the authority of a legislator.

(c) Both authoritarian rulers and colonial powers tend to educate and train administrative officials but dis-

courage or neglect representative officials. Hence executive officials often appear more qualified for leadership.

(d) In most newly independent countries there are deep racial, ethnic, religious, social and economic divisions. It is realized by the responsible political leaders that the civil service is one of the few positive cohesive forces and hence is indispensable in the nation-building process.

(e) The bureaucracy has become identified with peace and order because it almost single handedly restored and enforced order during the period of civil strife immediately following independence.

Tension between the bureaucracy as the guardian of efficiency and the legislators epitomizing the principle of popular representation is therefore to be expected. Hence the course of political development in these countries is intimately involved with the ability of rep-

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TABLE II. Educational Background of Legislators in Selected Countries
(Percentages)

	India 1957-1962	Turkey 1946-1951	Pakistan 1956-1958		
			East	West	Total
Less than college	39.8	25.2	7.5	35.0	21.3
College					
Domestic	44.7		90.0	47.5	68.7
Foreign	8.7	72.7	2.5	17.5	10.0
Unknown	4.2	0.2	–	–	–
Vacant Seats	2.6	1.9	–	–	–

resentative assemblies to gain the confidence and loyalty of the electorate and to absorb the gradually politized masses in their own power base. Only under such conditions can the legislature in fact enforce its constitutional primacy over a powerful administrative machinery.

Since the political future of underdeveloped countries is closely related to the prospects of the legislators, it may be most useful to acquire a more accurate picture of the social, economic and ideological background of the present members of their legislatures.

Research along these lines may proceed with the official biographical data available in most of these countries. A comparison, based on crude data of occupation, age, and educational composition, between the recently defunct Pakistani and Iraqi parliaments, on one hand, and the more viable legislatures of India and Turkey, may supply some preliminary indications (see Tables I, II and III).

It is clear, however, that official biographies may serve at best as a point of departure. Since they are compiled on the basis of data supplied by the individual legislator, the information often is colored by political expedience. Hence it is exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to separate the owners of landed estates from the peasantry; members of both groups often identify themselves as farmers. Yet clearly there is a significant distinction. A similar

TABLE III. Age Groups of Legislators in Selected Countries
(Percentages)

	India 1957-1962	Turkey 1946-1951	Pakistan 1956-1958		
			East	West	Total
Under 30	1.2				
30 – 40	23.2	9.0	12.5	10.0	11.2
40 – 50	26.3	26.2	22.5	27.5	25.0
50 – 60	28.5	34.4	30.0	45.0	37.5
60 – 70	10.1	22.8	27.5	12.5	20.0
70 and Over	1.6	3.5	7.5	5.0	6.3
Unknown	6.5	2.2	–	–	–
Vacant Seats	2.6	1.9	–	–	–

TABLE IV. Occupational Background of Legislators in Iraq
(Percentages)

	Official	Adjusted	Change
Landlords, farmers and tribal chiefs	49.6	51.7	+ 2.1
Lawyers	32.4	26.9	– 5.1
Teachers	6.9	–	– 6.9
Physicians	2.1	2.1	–
Civil Servants	–	9.6	+ 9.6
Journalists	2.1	2.8	+ 0.7
Merchants and Businessmen	2.1	4.1	+ 2.0
Engineers and Scientists	0.7	0.7	–
Military Personnel	4.1	1.4	– 2.7
Religious Leaders	–	0.7	+ 0.7

problem arises with respect to lawyers. There are many landlords who have law degrees, and there are some lawyers who own some land. Which occupation the official biography will list depends largely on the legislator's personal estimate of the relative prestige position of land owning or a law degree. A final example is the category of "social workers" in India. Many a professional politician lists his occupation as a "social worker" and declares his main interest in life to be the "uplift of the masses"; some do so with justification—but not all. A large portion of these distortions may be corrected through a personal interview with the legislator or by contacting reporters in the area and consulting newspaper files. Applying these methods, the occupational breakdown of the members of the Parliament in Iraq elected in 1958 but dissolved by the subsequent revolution is subject to some relevant adjustments (see Table IV).

In considering ideological orientation, the evidence of occupation, age or education, even if accurate, will necessarily remain circumstantial. Before a clear picture of the individual legislator's value structure and the "collective personality" of the legislature as a whole

can emerge, some techniques of behavioral research need to be applied. Several methods are available. Most promising appears to be Charles Osgood's semantic differential. This type of guided free association test may penetrate to the core attitudes of the legislators, yielding valuable data that would complement and perhaps correct the inaccuracies of the biographical method. Furthermore, the adjustments themselves may be significant.

The administration of a semantic differential test to national legislators presumes personal contact between scholar and legislator, and hence the presence of the former in the country studied. The effectiveness of the method and the relevance of the resulting information requires that such a study be made simultaneously by researchers working in different countries. In short, it must be a team effort. It would therefore be most fortunate if, through PROD, scholars in different areas would find common interest in such a project and then would undertake this task collectively.

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Kindaika in Japanese Urban-Rural Relations

Reports on a conference at Stanford on urban-rural relations in Japan, and summarizes a number of papers by an inter-cultural, inter-disciplinary group of scholars. (Cf. A. W. Burks' "Kindaika," PROD, May 1959).

How many-faceted a thing *kindaika* (modernization) can be was demonstrated in a conference on urban-rural relations in Japan, held under the auspices of Stanford University at Carmel, California, August 11-17. The fundamental question before the participants was whether the directions and pace of change were the same in the agricultural countryside as in the industrialized cities. Several new avenues of research were suggested.

Ronald Dore (sociology, University of British Columbia) attempted to account for the sharp increase in agricultural productivity, especially in Meiji Japan, by progressive landlords with urban connections, while Kazushi Ohkawa (economics, Hitotsubashi University) and Henry Rosovsky (economics, University of California, Berkeley) examined the role of agriculture in the whole economic development of modern Japan, finding that it helped subsidize industrial development until about 1930, after which it contributed less to national income and became instead a receiver of subsidies from the other sectors.

Mrs. Irene B. Taeuber (Office of Population Research, Princeton) and Masayoshi Namiki (Agricultural Research Institute, Japan) traced demographic correlations between urbanization and population growth. These indicated that although the agricultural population remained stationary, with its annual increase being either "pushed" or "pulled" into the urban areas, the urban population became increasingly complex with regard to internal (such as the rural influx) and foreign migration. The present low birth rate for Japan, compared to that of the United States, challenged common assumptions on the relation between industrialization and birth rates. Lower birth rates correlated with higher levels of husband's education in Japan. The implication of this for India, for instance, would be great, inasmuch as educational levels can advance faster than industrialization.

Differences in standards of living between rural and urban areas, studied by Tsutomu Ouchi (economics, Tokyo University), showed that the postwar boom for the farmers has given way again to the older trend of proportionally higher increases in urban living standards. Robert E. Ward (political science, University of Michigan), by a case study, and Junichi Kyoguku (political science, Tokyo University) and Nobutaka Ike (political science, Stanford University) with extensive statistical correlations, pointed out that Japan has much higher voting rates than the United States. Furthermore in Japan, voting rates for local elections and in rural areas are higher than those for national elections and in urban areas; the reverse is true in the United States. Since traditional pressures are used to deliver the high voting records in the countryside, the lower levels in cities may actually reflect greater voter independence and political consciousness.

Kurt Steiner (political science, Stanford University) and Takeyoshi Kawashima (law, Tokyo University) found that over the last century divorce rates in Japan have been falling, a fact that runs counter to Western experience in a period of industrialization. The divorce rate in Japan under traditional conditions was high, since women could be easily discarded if the house (*iye*)

was dissatisfied with her for any of a number of reasons. Thus, a decrease in divorces indicated modernization in the family system. The rate in the last few years, however, has started to rise again. This may mean that the traditional family is now developing along Western lines.

Continuing work in elite studies (and in keeping with the bio-historical method recently popular in Japan), Thomas C. Smith (economic history, Stanford University) dealt with the large proportion of business leaders who came from agrarian backgrounds. Finally, my own paper attempted to analyze the influence of labor and agrarian disputes in the process of modernization, considering them as catalysts in the spread of more modern political behavior, especially in the first decade after World War I.

Reinhart Bendix (sociology, University of California, Berkeley), commenting as a non-Japanologist, asked whether we had not now gone far enough with our use of the urban-rural dichotomy, even with all its refinements. He maintained that by focusing on this dichotomy, we tend to view modernization in terms of similarities with Western experience. If the process of transforming Japanese society were looked at as a whole, however, it is possible that new hypotheses might be developed which would reveal that modernization in Japan represents a unique process rather than a variation on a theme.

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Annotated BIBLIOGRAPHY on Policy Research and Political Behavior

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ET AL.: Question and Answer

A year or two after the outbreak of war, I was living in London and working with a section of the Admiralty Intelligence Division in the rooms of the Royal Geographical Society. Every day I walked across Kensington Gardens and past the Albert Memorial. The Albert Memorial began by degrees to obsess me. Like Wordsworth's leech-gatherer, it took on a strange air of significance; it

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> Like one whom I had met with in a dream;
> Or like a man from some far region sent,
> To give me human strength, by apt admonishment.

Everything about it was visibly misshapen, corrupt, crawling, verminous; for a time I could not bear to look at it, and passed with averted eyes; recovering from this weakness, I forced myself to look, and to face day by day the question: a thing so obviously, so incontrovertibly, so indefensibly bad, why had Scott done it? To say that Scott was a bad architect was to burke the problem with a tautology; to say that there was no accounting for tastes was to evade it by *suggestio falsi*. What relation was there, I began to ask myself, between what he had done and what he had tried to do? Had he tried to produce a beautiful thing; a thing, I meant, which we should have thought beautiful? If so, he had of course failed. But had he perhaps been trying to produce something different? If so, he might possibly have succeeded. If I found the monument merely loathsome, was that perhaps my fault? Was I looking in it for qualities it did not possess, and either ignoring or despising those it did?

I will not try to describe everything I went through in what, for many months, continued to be my daily communings with the Albert Memorial. Of the various thoughts that came to me in those communings I will only state one: a further development of a thought already familiar to me.

My work in archaeology, as I have said, impressed upon me the importance of the "questioning activity" in knowledge: and this made it impossible for me to rest contented with the intuitionist theory of knowledge favoured by the "realists." The effect of this on my logic was to bring about in my mind a revolt against the current logical theories of the time, a good deal like that revolt against the scholastic logic

which was produced in the minds of Bacon and Descartes by reflection on the experience of scientific research, as that was taking new shape in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The *Novum Organum* and the *Discours de la Methode* began to have a new significance for me. They were the classical expressions of a principle in logic which I found it necessary to restate: the principle that a body of knowledge consists not of "propositions," "statements," "judgments," or whatever name logicians use in order to designate assertive acts of thought (or what in those acts is asserted: for "knowledge" means both the activity of knowing and what is known), but of these together with the questions they are meant to answer; and that a logic in which the answers are attended to and the questions neglected is a false logic. . . .

I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer.

It must be understood that question and answer, as I conceived them, were strictly correlative. A proposition was not an answer, or at any rate could not be the right answer, to any question which might have been answered otherwise. A highly detailed and particularized proposition must be the answer, not to a vague and generalized question, but to a question as detailed and particularized as itself. For example, if my car will not go, I may spend an hour searching for the cause of its failure. If, during this hour, I take out number one plug, lay it on the engine, turn the starting-handle, and watch for a spark,

my observation "number one plug is all right" is an answer not to the question, "Why won't my car go?" but to the question, "Is it because number one plug is not sparking that my car won't go?" Any one of the various experiments I make during the hour will be the finding of an answer to some such detailed and particularized question. The question, "Why won't my car go?" is only a kind of summary of all these taken together. It is not a separate question asked at a separate time, nor is it a sustained question which I continue to ask for the whole hour together. Consequently, when I say "Number one plug is all right," this observation does not record one more failure to answer the hour-long question, "What is wrong with my car?" It records a success in answering the three-minute-long question, "Is the stoppage due to failure in number one plug?"

In passing, I will note (what I shall return to later on) that this principle of correlativity between question and answer disposes of a good deal of claptrap. People will speak of a savage as "confronted by the eternal problem of obtaining food." But what really confronts him is the problem, quite transitory like all things human, of spearing this fish, or digging up this root, or finding blackberries in this wood.

My next step was to apply this principle to the idea of contradiction. The current logic maintained that two propositions might, simply as propositions, contradict one another, and that by examining them simply as propositions you could find out whether they did so or not. This I denied. If you cannot tell what a proposition means unless you know what question it is meant to answer, you will mistake its meaning if you make a mistake about that question. It is therefore impossible to say of a man, "I do not know what the question is which he is trying to answer, but I can see that he is contradicting himself."

The same principle applied to the idea of truth. If the meaning of a proposition is relative to the question it answers, its truth must be relative to the same thing. Meaning, agreement and contridiction, truth and falsehood, none of these belonged to propositions in their own right, propositions by themselves; they belonged only to propositions as the answer to questions: each proposition answering a question strictly correlative to itself. . . .

Now, the question "To what question did So-and-so intend this proposition for an answer?" is an historical question, and therefore cannot be settled except by historical methods. When So-and-so wrote in a distant past, it is generally a very difficult one, because writers (at any rate good writers) always write for their contemporaries, and in particular for those who are "likely to be interested," which means those who are already asking the question to which an answer is being offered; and consequently a writer very seldom explains what the question is that he is trying to answer. Later on, when he has become a "classic" and his contemporaries are all long dead, the question has been forgotten; especially if the answer he gave was generally acknowledged to be the right answer; for in that case people stopped asking the question, and began asking the question that next arose. So the question asked by the original writer can only be reconstructed historically, often not without the exercise of considerable historical skill.

From R. G. Collingwood,
An Autobiography.
London: Oxford U. Press, 1939,
pp. 29-33, 39.

Should "Policy Science" Take the Stage?

(AN EDITORIAL)

Each social science has an aspect that may be called policy science. One can maintain that political science's only authentic and unambiguous mission is to synthesize these portions of social science. Moreover, it may be asserted that the next general task of political science should be to develop policy science.

The scope and method of policy science have been set forth most ably by Harold D. Lasswell, and indeed no one else seems to have used his concept fully. Some affirm that we have always studied public policy and little else. Others call the concept mere verbiage. And many empiricists feel uncomfortable in the presence of a thing so close to political ethics. It is notable that the book called *The Policy Sciences*, though valuable, is barely concerned with the study of the policy orientation. Moreover, we know of no courses that go by such a title.

Furthermore, it would appear strange to advocate policy science inasmuch as contemporary policy science is reacting against the old concentration upon public affairs. But the reaction has really been against legalism, against propaganda, against ethical confusion, against a lack of system, of science and of empiricism. Few would deny that public policy itself was a primary concern.

So the new policy science must begin with a belief that a level of method and theory have been reached that will permit a new preoccupation with policy to prosper without losing the values of science. Recent work on decision-making, the increased sophistication of elite theories, and the methods of case studies and sociometry assure more substance to the policy approach.

The risks are great. We may not have the ability now to improve the state of policy science and may cause a general decline in science in the attempt. But the emphasis upon interest groups as sources of theory is wearying. What don't we know about them, and more important, are we in the least likely to find it out? Little fundamental fact and theory are coming from sample surveys *per se:* we need more and more data on people's habits, but it may be the policy science approach that would make best use of the data.

How policy is made seems broader than these subjects and probably is more important as potentially applied science. If we could say in operational language how public policy is made then we could do better toward its making. Political science could then become more like the master science that Aristotle claimed it to be. Its impact on society would be greater, its practitioners more influential, its students and devotees more numerous and intelligent.

It is not sheer ambition that supports this hope; there is some evidence that the respect with which a science's problems are treated determines the general accomplishments of the science as science. So went the career of theology and metaphysics, so went mechanics, both celestial and mundane, so have gone psychology and economics. Let no one be fooled by the romantic agony that summoned great literature from garrets: Byron, Proust, d'Annunzio, Gide, Joyce and O'Neill cut great swaths in life. They had coteries and petticoats, fame and fortune sufficient unto the occasion.

To think that political science will become great if only because it is held in contempt and cares for problems no one is interested in is to fall victim to the beatnik *weltanschauung*. "Until philosophers are kings, or kings . . . have the spirit and power of philisophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils. . . ."